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Abstract 
This paper proposes a managerial control tool that integrates risk in efficiency scores. Building on 
existing efficiency specifications, our proposal reflects the real banking technology and accurately 
models the relationship between desirable and undesirable outputs. Specifically, the undesirable 
output is defined as non-performing loans to capture credit risk, and is linked only to the relevant 
dimension of the output set. We empirically illustrate how our efficiency measure functions for 
managerial control purposes. The application considers a unique dataset of Costa Rican banks during 
1998-2012. Efficiency scores’ implications are mostly discussed at bank-level, and their 
interpretations are enhanced by using accounting ratios. We also show the usefulness of our tool for 
corporate governance by examining performance changes around executive turnover. Results confirm 
that appointing CEOs from outside the bank significantly improves performance, thus suggesting the 
potential benefits of new organisational practices. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we propose a managerial control tool that integrates risk in efficiency 
estimations. Our new measure extends the work of Kuosmanen (2005) and is applied to the banking 
activity. Specifically, we devise an efficiency measure that reflects the real banking technology by 
accurately modelling the relationship between desirable and undesirable outputs, the latter of which 
represent credit risk. Our estimators match rationales of control (or monitoring) systems that are 
usually employed in banking. This study is thus embedded in the literature that assessed the relation 
between risk and bank efficiency and, on occasions, attempted to introduce risk in efficiency 
measures (see, e.g., Hughes and Mester (1998), Altunbas et al. (2000), Park and Weber (2006), 
Banker et al. (2010), Hsiao et al. (2010) or Barros et al. (2012)). Despite the various efforts, there 
remains a need to more directly use risk factors as an integrating part of efficiency analyses. Our new 
measure addresses this call for rigorous efficiency assessments that can be employed for managerial 
accounting control objectives. We illustrate our proposal via an empirical application that interprets 
efficiency in the presence of risk. Furthermore, we show how our monitoring tool can be employed 
for corporate governance purposes by examining executive turnover effects on future performance. 
Bank efficiency has been analysed from multiple angles (see, e.g., the reviews of Berger and 
Humphrey (1997), Goddard et al. (2001) or Fethi and Pasiouras (2010)). Among these, a largely 
preferred approach relies on non-parametric efficiency frontier techniques. These methods, best 
known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) are more suitable when multiple inputs are employed to 
obtain multiple outputs (see, e.g., Ray (2004)). Even if parametric models allow for stochastic errors, 
they have strong assumptions on functional distributions (which are not needed in non-parametric 
contexts) and do not allow for multiple objectives to be pursued or desirable and undesirable outputs 
to be jointly produced. The flexible nature of DEA is especially appealing for applications based on 
diverse management and accounting frameworks (Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell 1999; Banker et al. 2005). 
Hence, the literature on non-parametric efficiency analysis has experienced important developments 
(Cook and Seiford 2009; Cooper et al. 2011). 
Although bank efficiency has been extensively scrutinised, few studies introduced explicit 
risk variables in efficiency measures. Initially, parametric analyses did so under cost function 
approaches (McAllister and McManus 1993; Berger and DeYoung 1997; Hughes and Mester 1998; 
Altunbas et al. 2000). For instance, Hughes and Mester (1998) used the level of financial capital as a 
risk signal that bank managers employ for controlling output quality. Altunbas et al. (2000) express 
quality of loans through the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total loans. According to Berger 
and DeYoung (1997) and Van Hoose (2010) this variable captures the quality of monitoring over 
loans. There also exists a stream of literature that introduces risk in non-parametric bank efficiency 
analysis (Park and Weber 2006; Fukuyama and Weber 2010; Barros et al. 2012). In this case, risk 
takes the form of undesirable outputs, which for financial institutions are typically proxied through 
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NPL. This variable illustrates credit risk, which is crucial for the long-run bank activity (Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervision 2011). 
Yet, this latter stream of literature leaves two unaddressed issues. First, in typical production 
settings, desirable and undesirable outputs are jointly produced, in the sense that generating desirable 
outputs is not possible without generating undesirable outputs. This may not apply to banking activity, 
in which only certain outputs are linked to undesirable outputs such as NPL. Second, existing non-
parametric banking studies that introduce credit risk in efficiency assessments often assume constant 
returns to scale, whereas the technology is more likely to exhibit variable returns to scale (VRS) 
(Chambers and Pope 1996). 
To address these issues, the main contribution of this paper is to propose a tool for monitoring 
bank efficiency that integrates credit risk in efficiency analyses, while accurately defining the 
multiple-output bank technology. Due to these characteristics, our proposal is suitable for managerial 
control systems that aim at setting objectives and evaluating their degree of achievement. We start 
from the specification of Kuosmanen (2005) that properly models desirable and undesirable outputs 
when assuming VRS. We extend this model to correctly define the real banking technology. 
Specifically, undesirable outputs (NPL) are strictly linked only to that dimension of the output set that 
refers to credit (i.e. performing loans). The rest of outputs, such as investment portfolio or service 
fees, do not have a link with NPL. 
We empirically illustrate how our monitoring tool functions for assessing bank performance. 
The efficiency assessment is systematically interpreted and compared with conventional accounting 
ratios (i.e. return on assets (ROA) and net interest margin (NIM)). Given the managerial control focus, 
implications are usually discussed at bank-level, whereas we also briefly consider some industry-level 
effects of risk on performance. We then employ our proposal to examine performance changes around 
executive turnover, a specific corporate governance mechanism. Corporate governance literature 
states that accurate monitoring ex ante signals managers’ performance, while ex post monitoring is 
used to reveal potential gains from executive turnover (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Zhang and 
Rajagopalan 2010). This monitoring activity may well be done via our proposed measure. 
The empirical application considers a unique dataset of Costa Rican banks between 1998 and 
2012. This setting is attractive since it previously underwent important changes in the regulatory 
framework jointly with enhancements in monitoring practices. By 1997 bank activity was deregulated 
among the different players and the supervisory institution had all its monitoring functions in place. 
Thus, apart from the generally available accounting variables, the dataset presents well-structured 
information on NPL and organisational architecture. Moreover, in the first half of the analysed time 
span the monitoring over financial institutions was enhanced, and during the second half of the 
studied period the impact of the recent financial crisis can be observed (IMF 2003; 2013). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
the existing literature on bank performance and risk, and the consequences of executive turnover on 
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performance. Section 3 proposes our multidimensional efficiency measure in accordance with the 
theoretical underpinning presented. The Costa Rican banking industry is described in Section 4. In 
Section 5 the sample, variables and analysis stages are presented. Empirical results are found in 
Section 6, while the final section includes some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings and the usefulness of efficiency monitoring tools 
Technology advances and different episodes of economic fluctuations that have occurred over 
the past decades led many administrations from developing and developed economies to restructure 
financial sectors. These legal reforms were introduced to strengthen and stabilise the now deregulated 
financial systems, and focused on the structure of banking industries and the accurate functioning of 
supervisory institutions (Yildirim and Philippatos 2007; Banker et al. 2010). 
Following these profound reforms banks were expected to consolidate and improve their 
performance as legal changes aimed at enhancing, among others, risk management practices. Banks 
thus exert a more diligent oversight of their operations to signal their performance and safety to the 
market and supervisory agencies. The quality of risk management activities in banks is usually linked 
to credit risk and the levels of capital available to absorb potential financial losses. In this sense, 
monitoring activities are especially relevant when they are related to NPL’s management. In 
consonance with Berger and DeYoung (1997), Altunbas et al. (2000) and Van Hoose (2010), this 
variable is considered endogenous, and can be modelled as a function of management effort. 
As a result, bank outcomes can be seen as an informative signal about the manager’s 
unobserved ability. Using a principal-agent framework, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) remark that 
performance offers information about the CEO’s ability, and based on this observable measure the 
board evaluates the quality of the CEO. In addition, the board estimates the CEO’s ability, which 
represents a proxy of the expected performance. Therefore, CEO turnover is a control mechanism 
linked to the monitoring task of the board (Laux 2010). In this context, efficient managers signal their 
superior skills by introducing policies that improve the monitoring over their portfolios, which 
decreases the probability of financial losses. Conversely, poorly performing managers are more likely 
to incur higher losses due to ineffective loans’ monitoring. 
Banking literature on these risk- and control-related issues is two folded. On the one hand, 
there are studies that link risk with performance. To name just a few, analyses exist for the US 
(Hughes and Mester 1998), Japan (Altunbas et al. 2000; Barros et al. 2012), South Korea (Park and 
Weber 2006; Banker et al. 2010), Taiwan (Hsiao et al. 2010), Brasil (Tabak et al. 2011), for various 
Latin American countries (Yildirim and Philippatos 2007) or for 87 countries around the world 
(Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras 2010). Main findings indicate that the level of financial capital is 
positively related to efficiency and that using risk variables does not contribute to explaining scale 
inefficiencies (Hughes and Mester 1998; Altunbas et al. 2000). Evidence also suggests that NPL—
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used as a measure of credit risk—negatively influence efficiency (Barros et al. 2012). Moreover, 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) and Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010) find that changes in 
regulatory frameworks jointly with introducing monitoring tools help improving efficiency levels. 
On the other hand, banks face problems derived from inefficient monitoring (or control 
practices in general) since conflicts of interests may appear between principals, managers and 
depositors. Hence, research also scrutinises the relations between corporate governance mechanisms 
and performance. Nonetheless, similarly to the case of the link between risk and performance, few 
studies focus on the role of corporate governance on bank performance (Simpson and Gleason 1999; 
Macey and O’Hara 2003; Crespí et al. 2004; Laeven and Levine 2009). 
To the best of our knowledge, these two research streams do not converge. In this paper we 
propose a way to assess bank performance in the presence of risk, and introduce executive turnover to 
further isolate the effect that changes in management practices have on future performance. CEO 
replacements are crucial because they are often linked to the monitoring task of the board. There is a 
general consensus that the probability of CEO turnover is negatively related to performance, and that 
the board replaces a poorly performing CEO to enhance performance (Huson et al. 2001; Hermalin 
and Weisbach 2003). For these cases, existing findings suggest that improvements in shareholders’ 
wealth and firm operations follow CEO turnover (Denis and Denis 1995; Huson et al. 2004). 
At this point, it is important to notice that we focus on the origin of the successor rather than 
the type of departure. Even if distinguishing between voluntary and unexpected replacements is 
important, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Huson et al. (2004) report that a voluntary CEO 
departure can be due to retirement or the acceptance of an external position. As a result, voluntary 
departures are not a signal of poor management or performance, and consequently, firms’ future 
performance is expected to show smaller variations when compared with unexpected departures. In 
this way, not identifying the type of departure only adds noise to the proxy measure of executive 
turnover, which could lead to a downward biased estimate of performance changes. 
Concerning the type of successor, banks can appoint an insider or outsider CEO. When banks 
decide to promote an internal candidate, no significant improvements in performance are expected, 
since the new CEO is more likely to continue with the existing policies and routines. Alternatively, 
under the improved management hypothesis, a bank hires an outsider CEO to seek organisational 
change driven by this new agent who is not influenced by current mechanics. In this case, 
management quality is expected to enhance since outsiders usually have stronger incentives to prove 
their skills to the board by introducing new practices that potentially improve performance (Zhang 
and Rajagopalan 2010). Accordingly, Borokhovich et al. (1996), Farrell and Whidbee (2003) or 
Huson et al. (2004) report significant positive changes in firm performance when CEO departures 
were followed by the appointment of a CEO from outside the firm. 
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3. A proposal for assessing efficiency in the presence of risk 
When dealing with multiple inputs yielding multiple outputs, efficiency literature usually 
employs DEA-based frontier methods grounded in economic production theory (see, e.g., Ray (2004) 
or Cooper et al. (2011)). DEA is a non-parametric technique that approximates the true but unknown 
technology, imposes no restrictions on the sample distribution, and does not require input or output 
prices. Efficient decision-making units shape the best practice frontier, while for the rest of units DEA 
computes an inefficiency score indicating their distance to the frontier. Thus, DEA is a complex 
benchmarking technique, where all analysed units are compared against each other. Note that the 
frontier is considered to be the best available technology (i.e. it is an approximation of the real 
technology), and therefore the model projects inefficient units on it without proposing to improve 
existing best practices. 
Various DEA applications made way for developing diverse efficiency measures (see Ray 
(2004), Cooper et al. (2011) or the comprehensive review in Cook and Seiford (2009)). The growing 
awareness of the utility of DEA jointly with the need of well-defining inputs and outputs vectors led 
to new streams of research that not only account for inputs and desirable (good) outputs, but also 
accommodate undesirable (bad) outputs. The joint treatment of good and bad outputs is a current 
trend in the banking literature (Park and Weber 2006; Fukuyama and Weber 2010; Barros et al. 
2012), and—to name just another research stream—is widely employed for environmental studies 
(Färe et al. 2004; Kumar 2006; Sueyoshi and Goto 2011). 
Let us first specify a general technology with good and bad outputs, which will subsequently 
be adapted to the particular case of the banking industry. As a baseline we define 
1 1( (, , ) ,  , , )N MN Mx R y Rx y+ += =… ∈ … ∈x y  and 1( , , )J Jb Rb += … ∈b  as the vectors of inputs, good 
outputs and bad outputs, respectively. These form the technology T, representing the set of all output 
vectors (y and b) that can be produced using the input vector (x): ( ){ }:  can produce ( , )T = x y, ,b x y b . 
Obviously, if one does not differentiate between good and bad outputs, then the input vector (x) 
would produce a total output vector given by the sum of vectors y and b. 
When modelling DEA with good and bad outputs, technology (T) usually assumes convexity, 
strong disposability of inputs and good outputs, and weak disposability of bad outputs.1
                                                 
1 Strong disposability of inputs and good outputs implies that if (x,y,b) ∈T, 0 ≤ y’ ≤ y and x’ ≥ x (for each 
component) then (x’,y’,b) ∈ T. Weak disposability of bad outputs and good outputs implies that if (x,y,b) ∈ T 
then (x,θy,θb) ∈ T  for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. 
 The strong 
disposability constraint imposes that a larger quantity of inputs can be used to produce the same 
quantity of outputs, or fewer good outputs and the same quantity of bad outputs can be produced from 
a certain level of inputs. The weak disposability constraint indicates that to reduce bad outputs (a 
costly process), a unit must produce less total outputs, given fixed input levels. Best practice frontiers 
are shaped for each year by k = 1,…,K units in the corresponding period. 
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Yet another assumption, many times treated superficially, relates to the returns to scale. While 
assuming constant returns to scale has attractive properties, existing literature signalled that on most 
occasions the true technology experiences variable returns to scale (VRS). For instance, Chambers 
and Pope (1996) argued that restricting the returns to scale to constant should be avoided unless one 
analyses firms in long-run equilibrium. Moreover, managerial-oriented assessments should report 
pure technical efficiency scores. This is because, contrary to technical efficiency under constant 
returns to scale, pure technical efficiency (VRS) captures outcomes linked to managerial practices and 
reforming firm operations. 
Defining a VRS technology that allows some outputs to be weakly disposable while other 
outputs are strongly disposable can be problematic due to computational issues. This technology was 
accurately represented by Kuosmanen (2005). Furthermore, Kuosmanen’s specification is the VRS 
technology that most closely incorporates all observed activities and satisfies strong disposability of 
inputs and good outputs, weak disposability of bad outputs, and convexity (Kuosmanen and 
Podinovski 2009; Podinovski and Kuosmanen 2011). It can be defined as follows: 
{ '1
'
1
'
1
1
1
1
1
1
( , , ) : 0,   ,2, ,
                       ,   j ,2, ,
                       ,   n ,2, ,
                        
                     
K k k k k
m mk
K k k k k
j jk
K k k k
n nk
K k
k
mT x y b y y M
b b J
x x N
θ λ
θ λ
λ
λ
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
= ≥ ≥
=
≤
∑
∑
∑
∑



}
1
1
  0,    ,2, ,
                       0 1,    ,2, , .
k
k
k
k
K
K
λ
θ
=
=
≥
≤ ≤


 (1) 
Note that (1) develops the traditionally employed technology that does not differentiate 
between good (y) and bad (b) outputs (i.e. a total output vector is produced using the input vector x), 
and assumes convexity, VRS, and strong disposability of inputs and outputs. To reach this basic 
technology one just needs to completely remove both the bad outputs constraint and the abatement 
factor (θ) from expression (1). When modelling both good and bad outputs, this abatement factor 
enables the contraction of bad outputs only if accompanied by the contraction of good outputs. 
However, depending on the analysed industry, bad outputs may not be linked to all good 
outputs. When dealing with environmental performance, as exemplified by Podinovski and 
Kuosmanen (2011), one can think that a good output such as steel is always linked to a bad output, 
such as harmful emissions. Nevertheless, in other sectors such as banking or service industries not all 
good outputs are related to the bad outputs. In our case, banks grant loans, which may prove to be 
good (performing) or bad (non-performing, i.e., NPL) depending on the intensity of monitoring and 
customers’ behaviours. That is, the composition of the total loans is unaffected by other assets such as 
investment portfolios. To incorporate all these banking characteristics in efficiency analyses there is—
to the best of our knowledge—no formalised modelling of NPL, as most existing studies assume the 
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joint production of all bank outputs (see, e.g., Park and Weber (2006), Fukuyama and Weber (2010) 
or Barros et al. (2012)). 
We thus propose to separate the vector of good outputs (y) into two vectors of good outputs 
linked to bad outputs 1(( , , ) )I Iu Ru += … ∈u  and good outputs not linked to bad outputs 
1(( , , ) )L Lv Rv += … ∈v . That is, the production of the good output vector (u) implies that bad output (b) 
is also produced. Nonetheless, when producing the good output vector (v) there need not be any 
production of bad output (b). By using the abatement factor (θ) only for modelling the relation 
between bad outputs and their related good outputs, the technology is now: 
{ '1
'
1
'
1
'
1
1
1
1
( , , , ) : 0,   i ,2, ,  
                          ,   j ,2, ,
                          ,   l ,2, ,
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(2) 
Inefficiency is measured using the directional distance function proposed by Chambers et al. 
(1996). In its general form, the directional distance function seeks to simultaneously expand all types 
of good outputs, and contract bad outputs and inputs. Letting g = (gx,gu,gv,gb) be a directional vector, 
this function can be written as: 
( ) }{' ' ' ' ' ' ' ', , , max : , , , ) .k k k k k k k k kx u v bD x u v b x g u g v g b g Tδ δ δ δ δ= − + + − ∈
 
(3) 
However, the values of the directional vector g = (gx,gu,gv,gb) must be assigned. One could define g = 
(1,1,1,1) to obtain the maximum unit expansion in all good outputs and simultaneous unit contraction 
in bad outputs and inputs. Another of the many possibilities may be a vector g = (x,0,0,0) that would 
yield the percentage contraction in inputs, holding all outputs fixed. 
For this paper, the vector g = (x,u,v,b) is used, similarly to the proportional distance function 
proposed by Briec (1997). Following equation (3), this specification estimates the simultaneous 
expansion in all good outputs, contraction in bad outputs and contraction in inputs. Since we assess 
bank performance from a managerial control perspective, estimations are relevant at bank level. That 
is, the selected directional vector is in accordance with our objectives and framework as it allows 
taking into account bank specific characteristics.  
This directional distance function can be computed as the solution to a linear programme. The 
non-linear technology in (2) can be linearised using the substitution from Kuosmanen (2005): 
k k kz θ λ=  and (1 ) ,  k k k kµ θ λ= − ∀  so that k k kz µ λ+ = . Next, to model the technology in (2) and 
compute expression (3) expanding all good outputs and contracting all bad outputs, one must solve: 
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An efficient unit, situated on the best practice frontier, will have D(xk’,uk’,vk’,bk’) = 0, whereas 
values of D(xk’,uk’,vk’,bk’) > 0 show the degree of inefficiency of the analysed unit. Figure 1 presents a 
simplified representation of the directional distance function by illustrating the two-dimensional 
relation between the linked good and bad outputs. It also shows the difference between this function 
and the more traditional Shephard output distance function. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
On the one hand, the output distance function expands both linked good and bad outputs 
simultaneously, placing the output vector A on the boundary point C. On the other hand, the 
directional distance function starts at point A and scales taking a direction for increasing good outputs 
and decreasing bad outputs to point B on the boundary. Therefore, δuk’ is added to the linked good 
output and δbk’ is subtracted from the bad output. Additionally, even if not observable in the figure, 
the good outputs not linked to the bads are expanded by δvk’, whereas inputs are contracted by δxk’. 
 
4. The Costa Rican banking industry: Deregulation processes and consolidation 
As in other developing economies, the deregulation of the Costa Rican banking sector aimed 
at improving monitoring activities as well as enhancing banks’ competitiveness (Yildirim and 
Philippatos 2007). Before 1980, Costa Rican banks were tightly regulated in terms of interest rates 
and activities. Reforms started in 1984 by liberalising interest rate pricing policies. In 1992, the 
Central Bank removed the demand deposit monopoly to allow private banks to capture resources from 
the population. Also, banks were allowed to grant loans and operate in foreign currency (US dollars). 
In 1995 further reforms improved supervision tasks and the transparency of financial firms 
(IMF 2003). Due to increased market competition and the complexity of the banking system, the 
Central Bank created an independent supervisory agency to monitor banks, the Superintendent of 
Financial Entities (SUGEF). Similar policies were adopted in the securities and pension funds 
markets, where monitoring agencies were introduced. In 1997, the National Council of Supervision of 
the Financial System was created. This is the main supervisory authority of the financial system, 
which monitors and coordinates the superintendents of the banking system, the stock market, and the 
pension fund operators (IMF 2003). Thus, full disclosure of bank activities started in 1997. 
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One last reform took place in 2001, when SUGEF introduced the CAMELS rating framework 
to further enhance monitoring over financial institutions (IMF 2003). This scheme facilitates 
monitoring over six major aspects of financial firms: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, 
earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk (SUGEF 2000). SUGEF actively monitors all 
financial firms, including: state-owned commercial banks, private banks, mutual banks, cooperative 
banks, financial conglomerates, financial (non-banking) firms, credit unions and currency exchange 
offices. Yet, for the purposes of this paper, and given technology differences, we focus the analysis on 
those banks that operate under the same market conditions: the state-owned commercial banks, 
private banks, mutual banks and cooperative banks. 
First, state-owned banks are controlled by the Costa Rican government and, according to the 
financial regulations, they are considered independent firms since politicians do not influence their 
managerial decisions. This group attracted 54% of the deposits and 48% of the loans in 2012. The 
second group includes private banks. In 2012, this group controlled 29% of all deposits and 36% of 
the loans. The third group are the mutual banks, which in 2012 had 7% and 5% of the deposits and 
loans, respectively. Their deposits are, similarly to the state-owned banks, guaranteed by the 
government. The last group consists of cooperative banks, which, even if owned by their members, 
offer their services to any type of customer. In 2012 these firms accounted for 10% and 11% of the 
deposits and loans, respectively. 
At this point some considerations on sample characteristics are in order. First, it is worth 
noting that all Costa Rican banks operate under the same regulatory regime, and their capacity is 
unrestricted in terms of financial activities. Second, according to the financial regulations, banks’ 
boards have to be fully composed of outside members. Consequently, the positions of Chairman and 
CEO cannot be vested in the same person. This is consistent with the concerns of several corporate 
governance activists about the importance of the firm’s leadership structure. In this sense, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993) claim that concentration of decision and control rights in one 
individual reduces the board’s effectiveness and leaves internal control mechanisms in a weaker 
position for disciplining poor managers. In conclusion, financial laws not only restrict the composition 
of the board of directors, but also introduce transparency mechanisms that facilitate the access to 
detailed information on financial operations and organisational architecture. 
 
5. Sample, variables and analysis stages 
5.1 Sample and Variables 
Data come from the Costa Rican Central Bank, are publicly available, and comprise 
information for all banks operating in the industry during 1998-2012. This period witnessed a limited 
number of entries and exits, and, given the similar objectives of the studied financial institutions (see 
Section 4), we decided to use an unbalanced panel that encompasses all state, private, mutual and 
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cooperative banks that participate in the market. Thus, the total analysed sample comprises 663 firm-
year observations.2
Banking efficiency literature identifies two main approaches for evaluating financial 
institutions (see the surveys of Berger and Humphrey (1997), Goddard et al. (2001) or Fethi and 
Pasiouras (2010)). These are the production and intermediation approaches. Under the production 
approach banks are viewed as producers of both deposits and loans. In this case inputs are labour and 
capital. The intermediation approach considers that banks attract deposits and purchased funds that 
are transformed into loans and financial investments. Hence, in this second definition, one should also 
introduce funds (i.e. the raw material to transform) as inputs. 
 
This study utilises the intermediation approach, which is thought to be better suited to the 
currently deregulated banking activities (Berger and Humphrey 1997; Goddard et al. 2001). Apart 
from traditional balance sheet variables (e.g. deposits, assets, securities or loans), one should also 
account for other non-balance sheet dimensions. We partly capture these dimensions by adding gains 
from fee-based operations, which can be considered a non-traditional output (Illueca et al. 2009). 
Moreover, due to the purpose of the study and the modelling of outputs, total loans are divided into 
performing (good) loans and non-performing (bad) loans. Table 1 presents the mean values of inputs 
and outputs for the analysed period. The selected inputs are: (x1) deposits, (x2) fixed assets, (x3) wages, 
and (x4) general administrative expenses. These thoroughly express funding, capital, labour and 
operating costs, respectively. Outputs are: (u) performing loans, (b) non-performing loans (NPL), (v1) 
securities (investment portfolio), and (v2) service fees (non-interest income). 
[Table 1 about here] 
Performing and non-performing loans are separated from the total loans using the rules set by 
the SUGEF. Specifically, NPL (be they mortgages, regular loans or corporate loans) are those past 
due for at least 90 days. These two output categories represent the linked good (u) and bad (b) 
outputs, as banks inevitably produce them simultaneously. In fact, NPL reflect credit risk and data 
show only positive values for both performing and non-performing loans. However, credit and the 
other considered outputs are mutually exclusive. Therefore, securities and service fees (v) represent 
banking dimensions unrelated with loans and are introduced as good outputs not linked to the 
undesirable output (NPL). 
Efficiency scores derived from our proposal in equation (4) are interpreted jointly with 
accounting ratios to further reveal their managerial implications. Most of these discussions are carried 
out at bank-level, whereas we also briefly discuss some average industry-level effects of risk on 
performance. Descriptive statistics for the accounting ratios and risk variables are presented in Table 
2. Accounting measures evaluate economic performance, and are specified through return on assets 
(ROA) computed as the ratio of profit to total assets, and the net interest margin (NIM), which is the 
                                                 
2 Section 5.2 explains how data are used to construct the best practice frontiers. 
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difference between interest income and interest expense relative to total assets. Risk is measured via 
two ratios commonly used in previous studies (Altunbas et al. 2000; Park and Weber 2006; Banker et 
al. 2010; Barros et al. 2012). First, for our main bank-level analysis, the NPL ratio is given by non-
performing loans relative to total loans. Second, for supplementary industry-level interpretations, a 
proxy variable for the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is calculated as equity plus risk-weighted reserves 
divided by total assets. 
[Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
For the analysis related to executive replacements, Table 3 presents the frequency of CEO 
turnover during 2000-2010 and the type of the incoming manager. We consider that a CEO turnover 
corresponds to a specific period only if the name of the top manager changes in two consecutive 
years. Thus, CEO turnover is captured by a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the top 
executive manager was replaced, and zero otherwise. In addition, two dummy variables take the value 
of one if the successor is from inside or outside the bank, and zero otherwise. An internal promotion is 
identified if the new CEO was part of either the board or the top management team in the year prior to 
her appointment. 
 
5.2. Frontier specifications and analysis stages 
We first compute the efficiency scores following the proposal in equation (4) and using the 
inputs and outputs specified in Section 5.1. There are, nonetheless, some more considerations 
necessary. First, literature expresses concerns linked to production possibilities. One example is found 
in Kumar and Rusell (2002), who point out that the true but unobservable frontier should include the 
knowledge accumulated from previous periods. Second, pitfalls may appear in the presence of a 
reduced number of observations and a relatively high number of input and output dimensions. 
Both concerns are addressed by using technology specifications including sequential 
reference sets (Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut 1995). A sequential reference set implies that the current 
period technology depends not only on contemporary observations of inputs and outputs, but also on 
combinations from all previous periods. That is, the technology (i.e. the efficiency frontier) is 
constructed from all observed best practices of banks in the sample (for empirical applications see, 
e.g., Park and Weber (2006) or Banker et al. (2010)). When listing results, scores are reported only for 
the year under analysis. However, when the analysed period is extensive, sequential frontiers 
including all pervious periods can lead to efficiency estimates that are difficult to interpret, or even 
unreliable. This becomes even more so when the analysis includes both progress and regress periods. 
Taking into account these concerns jointly with our bank-level focus, we construct frontiers 
that match control systems. In managerial settings it makes sense to benchmark against best practices 
from the current period and also to use feedback from the relevant previous periods (Kaplan and 
Atkinson 2000). Indeed, the benchmarking literature usually states that managerial best practices used 
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as targets for control should be relevant, attainable and—to the possible extent—observable (Camp 
1995). On many occasions, frontier targets from the recent previous periods are the objectives 
employed for control activities, while the current year benchmarks can help verifying whether the 
bank is currently a good practice. In turn, the current period results and targets become objectives for 
managerial control in the near future. 
To match the managerial control setting described above, we use a three-year “sequential 
window” that reports scores for the analysed (third) year. Furthermore, for each new period we drop 
the oldest one, so that the frontier is always shaped by three periods. This is a combination between 
the sequential frontier approach of Tulkens and Vanden Eeckhaut (1995) and the more traditional 
window analysis of Charnes et al. (1984). That is, we apply the window analysis rationale of nested 
relevant periods, but report the results only for the last year, similar to the sequential sets of Tulkens 
and Vanden Eeckhaut (1995). Note that this approach is natural from a strategic management 
perspective, as it follows the rationale of mid-term planning and control (see, e.g., Grant (2008)). 
The sensitivity of the efficiency scores is scrutinised by estimating “sequential windows” of 
different extensions and the usual sequential approach that includes all previous years. Although the 
magnitude of the scores changes (by construction) the overall tenor of the results and general 
interpretations do not. For the main discussion, we follow the above managerial rationale of a three-
year “sequential window”. Results are reported yearly for the period 1998-2012, whereas the 
reference technology includes the analysed year jointly with the previous two. 
These efficiency scores have a managerial interpretation not only due to the benchmarking for 
monitoring bank activity, but also because of the particularities of the proportional distance function 
employed in equation (4). We reach bank-level interpretations that are not always easily aggregated to 
industry-level results, which are more relevant to regulators (see, e.g., Färe and Grosskopf (2004)). A 
supplementary industry-level analysis—which we detail in the Appendix and only briefly discuss in 
Section 6—provides some effects of risk on bank performance. 
Finally, we employ our proposal to examine the effect of CEO turnover on future 
performance. This special case provides an ideal illustration of how the benchmarked efficiency 
scores that account for risk can be used for corporate governance purposes. We track performance 
changes over time spans of five years centred on the replacement year. In line with our theoretical 
underpinnings, we distinguish between the effects of appointing an outsider or insider CEO. 
Moreover, following Huson et al. (2004), we control for potential problems related to mean reversion 
of performance time-series. Details on this analysis and its results are presented in Section 6.2. 
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6. Results 
6.1. Efficiency and accounting performance assessments 
Prior to reporting the efficiency assessments of our proposal in equation (4) we have run 
additional tests to confirm the influence of NPL and the significance of correctly introducing them in 
the banking technology. Specifically, we have computed efficiency scores following two alternative 
models. First, a traditional specification of the technology considers total loans as a desirable output, 
and therefore does not account for credit risk. The second alternative follows Kuosmanen (2005) and 
introduces NPL as a bad output linked to all good outputs (performing loans, securities and service 
fees). Bear in mind that in the introduction and the methodology-related sections we argue that this—
even if computationally correct—is not an accurate representation of the real banking technology. The 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to detect the existing differences between our proposal and the 
two alternative models for the period 1998-2012. Outcomes clearly demonstrate that our proposal of 
linking NPL only to their corresponding good output attains efficiency estimates significantly 
different at 1% from the traditional model (Z-value -17.326) and the specification that links the bad 
output (NPL) to all good outputs (Z-value -4.582), respectively. This corroborates that our measure is 
not only closer to the real banking technology in theoretical terms, but also makes a difference for the 
interpretation of the results. Thus, in what follows the scores of our proposed NPL model (equation 
(4)) are analysed. 
Keep in mind that scores of zero indicate efficient banks, whereas higher values point to the 
degree of inefficiency. For illustrative purposes, suppose that a fictitious bank has the following input 
and output vectors: (x1, x2, x3, x4, u, v1, v2, b) = (600, 310, 200, 150, 400, 320, 70, 100), and a 
corresponding efficiency score δ = 0.03. To operate efficiently, this bank should expand performing 
loans (u) by 400 × 0.03 = 12, securities (v1) by 320 × 0.03 = 9.6, and service fees (v2) by 70 × 0.03 = 
2.1. It should also simultaneously contract NPL (b) by 100 × 0.03 = 3, while reducing deposits (x1) by 
600 × 0.03 = 18, fixed assets (x2) by 310 × 0.03 = 9.3, wages (x3) by 200 × 0.03 = 6, and 
administrative expenses (x4) by 150 × 0.03 = 4.5. 
Note that the interpretation of the efficiency score is bank-specific. This aspect is of crucial 
importance for the managerial control emphasis, as it accounts for the analysed banks’ heterogeneous 
characteristics. The diverse directions of the proportional vector sometimes complicate the 
interpretation of industry-level results (Färe and Grosskopf 2004). In this context, the yearly average 
industry inefficiencies represent the evolution of the sector based on heterogeneous bank-specific 
inefficiencies. Thus, we interpret these average scores given our research perspective. 
[Figure 2 and Table 4 about here] 
In Figure 2 and Table 4 one can notice that, after peaking in 1999 (0.14), bank-level average 
inefficiencies generally decrease to the lowest level of 0.03 in 2006. This first half of the studied 
period is characterised by enhancements in the monitoring activities gradually introduced by the 
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regulatory institutions (IMF 2003). Such reforms usually aim at enhancing banks’ competitiveness 
and arguably banks need to adapt to the new market conditions (Park and Weber 2006; Lozano-Vivas 
and Pasiouras 2010). It may well be that the analysed banks anticipated these regulatory changes and 
adapted their internal control practices to the developing competitive environment. A potential reason 
for the relative lack of fluctuations in inefficiency scores at the start of the 2000s is that, due to more 
stable market conditions, reforms were not that drastic as in other Latin American countries (Yildirim 
and Philippatos 2007). During this first half of the analysed period there is a potential bubble effect. 
One may think that banks report lower proportions of NPL during 2003-2008 given this potential pre-
crisis bubble, but it may also be the case that fewer bad debtors exist during growth periods. These 
mixed effects due to reforms, potential bubbles and the mere existence of bad debtors are extremely 
difficult to disentangle. 
The second half of the period is dominated by the recent financial crisis. The number of bad 
debtors increases due to the economic downturn and around 2009-2010 the NPL ratio shows early-
2000s levels. Salient effects are observed in 2008 when reported bank-level inefficiency scores reach 
an average of 0.06. These levels remain roughly unchanged until 2010-2011. Towards the end of the 
time span, average bank-specific inefficiencies are of 0.05, slightly lower than the main financial 
downturn period (2008-2010). Although one could expect an earlier and more accentuated recovery, 
this event was directly influenced by yet another series of regulatory pressures. On the background of 
the global economic crisis, financial capital requirements became more severe and aimed at, among 
other objectives, attaining Basel III capital adequacy levels (IMF 2013). Banks gradually adopted 
these conditions (mostly after 2009), which may have diverted attention of managers from internal 
operations to meeting the new market standards. 
Taking a managerial control perspective, throughout the period banks can use the scores for 
performance evaluations. Given their comprehensive nature, which accounts for risk and includes 
distances to relevant competitors during mid-term strategic periods, the efficiency scores can be the 
basis of evaluating executives. This specific application is presented in Section 6.2. 
[Figure 3 and Table 5 about here] 
To provide some complementary industry-level interpretations, we complement the analysis 
with traditional accounting ratios. Results for ROA and NIM are shown in Figure 3 and Table 5. The 
insights from the efficiency scores are more difficult to observe in these one-dimensional accounting 
ratios that do not capture the different types of banking activities. ROA confirms to a great extent the 
results obtained from the efficiency assessment (see, e.g., the negative results for 1999, 2004 or the 
crisis period). However, ROA shows a more zigzag pattern and does not illustrate the slight 
improvement at the end of the analysed period. These differences may appear because ROA includes 
extraordinary results not related to the banks’ core activity. 
The NIM experiences a rather constant decrease between 2002 and 2009. This ratio could be 
considered a more useful profitability measure of current and future bank performance as its 
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components (interest income and expenses) represent a large proportion of total bank revenues and 
costs (Van Hoose 2010). NIM decreases could signal enhanced market competition, which enforces 
performance and consequently narrows margin spreads (Bikker and Bos 2008). This is consistent with 
industry reforms introduced during the first half of the studied period (Yildirim and Philippatos 2007). 
A supplementary industry-level analysis of the impact of risk on performance is presented in 
the Appendix. Results show that banks with higher NPL ratios exhibit higher inefficiency levels.3
In the case of the CAR, results illustrate the positive effects of capital requirements on 
accounting results. While no effect of the CAR is reported for the efficiency scores, this ratio is 
positively related to ROA and NIM. Significant CAR results may signal that external monitoring 
helps banks obtain better accounting profitability results. The financial soundness of this variable 
reduces uncertainty, and allows banks to have better operational flexibility and market positions, 
which could reduce fund rising costs (Das and Ghosh 2006; Banker et al. 2010; Hsiao et al. 2010). 
 
This ratio is useful for internal monitoring, and results indicate that higher levels of NPL are costly for 
bank operations. Thus, enhancing monitoring levels over loans may be beneficial for bank efficiency. 
Alternatively, in the long-run high proportions of NPL could sometimes indicate higher risk taking. 
Incentives for risk taking may exist because equity owners could gain more if the bank experiences 
gains from risk taking (Van Hoose 2010). Findings for ROA and NIM confirm that higher NPL ratio 
levels are negatively related to short-run performance, in line with previous studies (Banker et al. 
2010; Hsiao et al. 2010). 
 
6.2. Performance changes following executive turnover 
We now employ our proposal to examine the effect of CEO turnover on future performance. 
This analysis allows us to illustrate how efficiency scores can be used for corporate governance 
purposes. We scrutinise the performance changes shown by banks during a five years period centred 
on the CEO turnover year. For analytical purposes, we follow the procedure used by Denis and Denis 
(1995) and Huson et al. (2004) to correct for potential problems linked to mean reversion of 
performance time-series. Thus, annual performance values are calculated for two sub-periods around 
CEO turnover: from year –2 to year –1 (ex ante), and from year –1 to year +2 ex post executive 
replacement (see Table 6). In order to correctly examine the performance path followed by banks 
before and after CEO turnover, we only maintain in the sample those CEOs whose tenures cover the 
full period analysed (i.e. two years before replacement for the outgoing CEOs and two years post-
replacement for the incoming ones) (see Table 3).  
                                                 
3 Keep in mind that the NPL ratio is computed as NPL over total loans. In the efficiency model only NPL 
appear, and do so as an output. Furthermore, in DEA models, more or less of one output or input does not imply 
higher or lower inefficiency. 
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To further corroborate the robustness of our results for the accounting ratios, we also estimate 
two alternative variables that account for market trends. These are median-adjusted ROA and NIM, 
which are obtained by subtracting, for each year, the median value of the corresponding measure for 
all firms in our sample. Note that DEA scores represent an efficiency assessment based on the 
technology of the sector (i.e. a benchmarking technique), and therefore adjusting to industry-median 
values is not appropriate. In this fashion, industry-adjusted performance changes following CEO 
turnover isolate the effect of CEO turnover on performance changes from variations attributable to the 
industry. 
[Figures 4 and 5, and Table 6 about here] 
Findings suggest that inefficiency tends to be lower in those banks that replaced the CEO 
(Figure 4). Figure 5 plots, for the five years period centred on the turnover year, the mean inefficiency 
values. Furthermore, it differentiates CEO turnover followed by appointing an insider (dotted line) or 
an outsider (dashed line) from the solid line that includes all CEO replacements. One can notice that 
the positive effect of CEO turnover on future performance is driven by those replacements followed 
by the appointment of a CEO from outside the bank. To the contrary, appointing an insider is 
associated with inefficiency increases. 
Results in Panel A of Table 6 show that mean inefficiency around CEO turnover decreases 
from 0.08 (–2 to –1) to 0.06 (–1 to +2). This difference is significantly different from zero, and all the 
positive effect comes from appointing outsider CEOs. Indeed, when the incoming CEO is an outsider 
inefficiency significantly decreases from 0.09 (–2 to –1) to 0.07 (–1 to +2) and 57% of banks improve 
their efficiency. Similar findings are obtained for the accounting ratios (Panels B to E in Table 6). In 
the case of the ROA and NIM (both adjusted and unadjusted), performance significantly improves 
when appointing an outsider.  
These results corroborate that CEO turnover is an important control mechanism, and that its 
effectiveness becomes especially relevant when the incoming manager is an outsider. This could 
signal not only that managers from outside are not influenced by banks’ internal routines, but also that 
outsiders are more likely to introduce new practices and seek organisational changes, which are 
expected to improve operating performance (Farrell and Whidbee 2003; Huson et al. 2004). In this 
sense, outsiders may well have stronger incentives to prove the quality of their management skills to 
the board (Zhang and Rajagopalan 2010). 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
This paper takes a managerial control approach to develop a monitoring tool for assessing 
bank performance. Specifically, it proposes a multidimensional efficiency measure that accounts for 
the joint production of desirable outputs (performing loans, securities and service fees) and an 
undesirable output that represents credit risk (non-performing loans (NPL)). While some previous 
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efforts to introduce risk in efficiency assessments exist, these have been scarce (see, e.g., the cost 
function approach of Hughes and Mester (1998) or Altunbas et al. (2000), or the use of NPL in Park 
and Weber (2006) and Barros et al. (2012)). Incorporating risk in efficiency analyses is increasingly 
important on the background of the financial crisis.  
Our proposal extends Kuosmanen’s (2005) specification to define the real banking technology 
that exhibits VRS and in which not all desirable outputs are linked to undesirable outputs. In this 
study, NPL are strictly linked only to that output category that affects their levels (performing loans), 
while the rest of outputs are not related to NPL. When modelling the technology, NPL are introduced 
as an endogenous risk measure that proxies the quality of monitoring over loans.  
An empirical application illustrates how the proposed monitoring tool functions. The overall 
efficiency assessment considers the period 1998-2012, which includes two types of changes in the 
banking competitive environment. The first half of the period is characterised by gradual changes in 
the regulatory framework that aimed at enhancing monitoring activities. Results show general average 
bank-specific efficiency improvements over this period. ROA results mostly corroborate the 
efficiency scores. Also, the NIM slightly decreases, which could signal enhanced market competition 
and consolidation of banks (Bikker and Bos 2008). During this period—among other reforms—the 
CAMELS rating scheme was introduced. Findings suggest that banks anticipated this regulatory 
change and adapted internal practices to the developing market conditions (Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell 
1999; Park and Weber 2006; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras 2010).  
The second half of the analysed period is mostly dominated by the current financial crisis. 
After experiencing decreases during 2006-2008, average bank-specific efficiency remains relatively 
unchanged after 2008, with minor improvements towards the end of the period. Given the severe and 
extended financial crisis, this period witnessed the introduction of more rigorous financial capital 
requirements by national and international regulatory bodies (see, e.g., IMF (2013) for the Basel III 
requirements). Banks gradually adopted these conditions after 2009, which may have swayed 
managers towards the enforcement of the new market standards rather than attaining superior 
efficiency by improving internal operations. 
Our comprehensive efficiency measure accounts for risk and includes distances to relevant 
competitors during mid-term strategic periods. From a managerial control perspective, these 
characteristics enhance the efficiency scores’ attractiveness for corporate governance purposes. If 
internal and external control mechanisms work properly, efficiency scores should capture 
performance changes following CEO turnover events. We find that changes in top executives lead to 
greater efficiency and accounting performance. This effect mainly holds when the incoming CEO is 
an outsider. According to the improved management hypothesis, this could indicate that outsiders 
have a clearer influence on performance since they introduce new organisational practices (Huson et 
al. 2004). In addition, managers appointed from outside have stronger incentives to prove their 
potential quality to the board by showing their management skills (Zhang and Rajagopalan 2010). 
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There are a series of limitations to our study that, in turn, represent avenues for future 
research. Our proposal takes a managerial control approach to evaluating bank efficiency. Yet, there 
are some trade-offs between this bank-specific approach and more industry-oriented analyses. Future 
research could extend the analysis to include issues of interest to policy makers and regulators. First, 
by using homogenous directions of the directional vector—instead of a proportional distance function 
based on observed bank-specific input and output vectors—efficiency scores can be easily aggregated 
and interpreted at industry level (see aggregation issues in Färe and Grosskopf (2004)). In this case, 
vector directions can be chosen according to industry-level policy objectives and thus complement 
this study’s managerial approach that uses bank-level scores. 
Second, the effects of reforms or bank corporate governance characteristics (such as 
ownership type) could, alternatively to our proposal, be modelled using the concept of selective 
convexity introduced by Podinovski (2005). This method allows for individual judgements of each 
input and output according to the convexity assumption. Given that relaxing convexity is an attractive 
topic when discussing the benchmarking role of frontiers, this research avenue could be followed to 
enhance our corporate governance interpretations. Finally, new analyses could scrutinise scale 
efficiency issues. Banks operating under increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale are 
potentially differently affected by risk and regulatory measures. This study can be a starting point 
towards analysing these issues from industry policy-making perspectives. 
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Figure 1. The directional distance function with good and bad outputs 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Efficiency scores: Mean values 
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Figure 3. Accounting performance: Mean values 
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Figure 4. Efficiency changes around CEO turnover 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Efficiency changes around CEO turnover: Insiders vs. Outsiders 
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Table 1. Inputs and outputs: Mean values (1998–2012) 
Year Deposits (x1) 
Fixed 
assets 
(x2) 
Wages 
(x3) 
Admin. 
expenses 
(x4) 
Total 
loans 
(u+b) 
Performing 
loans 
(u) 
NPL 
(b) 
Securities 
(v1) 
Service 
fees 
(v2) 
1998 55,482 5,852 3,243 1,688 43,744 42,486 1,257 30,524 1,564 
1999 58,744 6,332 3,539 2,117 48,296 47,063 1,233 34,304 1,714 
2000 66,143 4,953 3,723 2,469 59,852 57,785 2,066 36,812 2,064 
2001 66,421 5,079 4,202 2,832 70,770 69,153 1,617 36,514 2,271 
2002 70,302 5,800 4,577 3,025 78,925 76,429 2,496 41,218 2,430 
2003 75,010 5,171 4,879 3,258 88,207 86,746 1,460 43,692 3,027 
2004 103,658 5,825 6,115 3,600 102,479 100,492 1,987 66,097 3,695 
2005 111,999 6,085 6,504 3,890 117,455 115,881 1,574 66,514 4,138 
2006 123,721 6,286 6,856 4,088 136,017 134,215 1,802 67,259 4,582 
2007 132,728 6,948 7,398 4,467 175,707 173,696 2,012 53,834 5,340 
2008 145,285 7,567 7,267 4,704 206,131 203,023 3,107 42,275 5,817 
2009 173,836 7,899 7,702 5,008 205,414 201,146 4,268 55,524 6,265 
2010 167,520 7,677 7,784 5,039 200,013 196,267 3,746 60,330 6,338 
2011 170,480 7,794 8,243 5,116 220,151 216,206 3,945 51,573 6,792 
2012 190,140 8,012 8,953 5,264 246,044 241,868 4,177 62,852 7,477 
Total 110,951 6,431 5,925 3,686 128,746 126,341 2,405 49,031 4,097 
The sample includes information for the Costa Rican banking firms between 1998 and 2012. All monetary 
values are expressed in millions of 2012 Costa Rican colones, and are deflated with respect to inflation. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Accounting performance and risk variables: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Total assets 222,463 559,411 410 4,065,165 
ROA 0.0184 0.0434 -0.7339 0.1088 
NIM 0.0663 0.0345 -0.0373 0.1943 
NPL ratio 0.0210 0.0410 0.0000 0.6580 
CAR 0.2284 0.1608 0.0441 0.9774 
The sample includes information for the Costa Rican banking firms between 1998 and 2012. Total assets are 
expressed in millions of 2012 Costa Rican colones. Return on assets (ROA) is defined as the ratio of net profit 
divided by total assets. The net interest margin (NIM) is the difference between interest income and interest 
expense relative to total assets. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) divides equity and risk-weighted reserves by 
total assets. For the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio, NPL are divided by total loans. Number of observations: 
663. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Frequency table for CEO turnover during 2000–2010 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
ΔCEO  5 3 2 7 3 5 6 2 5 4 7 49 
Insider 2 0 0 4 0 1 2 1 1 2 2 15 
Outsider 3 3 2 3 3 4 4 1 4 2 5 34 
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Table 4. Efficiency scores: Descriptive statistics 
Year Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
1998 51 0.1188 0.1565 0.0000 0.5143 
1999 50 0.1408 0.1738 0.0000 0.6307 
2000 50 0.1127 0.1517 0.0000 0.4671 
2001 47 0.0839 0.1220 0.0000 0.4316 
2002 47 0.0708 0.1079 0.0000 0.3857 
2003 46 0.0619 0.0940 0.0000 0.3257 
2004 42 0.0650 0.0963 0.0000 0.3248 
2005 40 0.0582 0.0843 0.0000 0.3430 
2006 41 0.0335 0.0530 0.0000 0.2255 
2007 40 0.0384 0.0656 0.0000 0.2322 
2008 42 0.0558 0.0857 0.0000 0.3057 
2009 42 0.0552 0.0973 0.0000 0.3448 
2010 42 0.0569 0.0909 0.0000 0.3318 
2011 42 0.0541 0.0806 0.0000 0.3530 
2012 41 0.0513 0.0755 0.0000 0.2484 
Total 663 0.0728 0.1135 0.0000 0.6307 
Note that the number of observations stands for the number of reported scores, whereas the 
sequential technology also includes banks from the two previous years. Efficiency is 
computed according to equation (4). 
 
 
 
Table 5. Accounting performance measures: Descriptive statistics 
  ROA NIM 
Year Obs. Mean S.D. Min.  Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
1998 51 0.0184 0.0327 -0.1537 0.0777 0.0713 0.0461 0.0078 0.1738 
1999 50 0.0065 0.1094 -0.7339 0.0930 0.0746 0.0506 -0.0373 0.1943 
2000 50 0.0110 0.0685 -0.4279 0.1009 0.0718 0.0443 0.0046 0.1906 
2001 47 0.0237 0.0237 -0.0276 0.1015 0.0720 0.0383 0.0268 0.1694 
2002 47 0.0249 0.0257 -0.0296 0.1086 0.0747 0.0364 0.0212 0.1742 
2003 46 0.0222 0.0209 -0.0166 0.1075 0.0718 0.0317 0.0306 0.1631 
2004 42 0.0152 0.0675 -0.3927 0.1066 0.0673 0.0296 0.0246 0.1602 
2005 40 0.0252 0.0181 0.0095 0.1088 0.0661 0.0320 0.0218 0.1769 
2006 41 0.0222 0.0160 0.0071 0.0941 0.0653 0.0289 0.0226 0.1455 
2007 40 0.0213 0.0174 -0.0056 0.0827 0.0637 0.0272 0.0158 0.1395 
2008 42 0.0230 0.0162 0.0059 0.0771 0.0594 0.0240 0.0182 0.1212 
2009 42 0.0167 0.0161 -0.0273 0.0751 0.0571 0.0226 0.0212 0.1112 
2010 42 0.0167 0.0168 0.0003 0.0812 0.0582 0.0237 0.0175 0.1215 
2011 42 0.0163 0.0175 -0.0035 0.0969 0.0572 0.0258 0.0234 0.1327 
2012 41 0.0151 0.0191 -0.0528 0.0942 0.0577 0.0251 0.0225 0.1309 
Total 663 0.0184 0.0434 -0.7339 0.1088 0.0663 0.0345 -0.0373 0.1943 
Return on assets (ROA) is defined as the ratio of net profit divided by total assets. The net interest margin 
(NIM) is the difference between interest income and interest expense relative to total assets. 
 
  
 27 
 
Table 6. Performance changes around CEO turnover (2000–2010) 
 Governance intervention Successor 
 No CEO turnover CEO turnover Insider Outsider 
Panel A: Efficiency     
–2 to –1 0.0762 (42:58) 0.0756 (43:57) 0.0423 (56:44) 0.0903 (37:63) 
–1 to +2 0.0614 (53:47) 0.0593 (52:48) 0.0332 (38:63) 0.0693 (57:43) 
Z Wilcoxon signed rank test –2.607*** –2.056** –0.806 –1.890* 
Panel B: ROA     
–2 to –1 0.0236 (44:56) 0.0186 (44:56) 0.0150 (44:56) 0.0202 (45:55) 
–1 to +2 0.0223 (40:60) 0.0213 (54:46) 0.0144 (31:69) 0.0239 (63:37) 
Z Wilcoxon signed rank test –3.991*** 1.587 –0.874 2.129** 
Panel C: Median adjusted ROA     
–2 to –1 0.0080 (45:55) 0.0041 (46:54) –0.0005 (50:50) 0.0060 (45:55) 
–1 to +2 0.0066 (46:54) 0.0078 (52:48) –0.0006 (38:63) 0.0109 (58:42) 
Z Wilcoxon signed rank test –3.580*** 1.566 –1.013 2.060** 
Panel D: NIM     
–2 to –1 0.0695 (48:52) 0.0665 (50:50) 0.0531 (56:44) 0.0723 (47:53) 
–1 to +2 0.0656 (43:57) 0.0713 (50:50) 0.0494 (44:56) 0.0795 (53:47) 
Z Wilcoxon signed rank test –6.272*** 2.095** –0.594 2.317** 
Panel E: Median adjusted NIM     
–2 to –1 0.0108 (48:52) 0.0085 (50:50) –0.0060 (56:44) 0.0145 (47:53) 
–1 to +2 0.0087 (50:50) 0.0170 (52:48) –0.0053 (44:56) 0.0256 (55:45) 
Z Wilcoxon signed rank test –2.842*** 3.238*** 0.734 3.137*** 
Percentage of firms with positive and negative changes in performance are reported in brackets (i.e. figures 
should be read as “percentage of positive changes : percentage of negative changes”). *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
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Appendix: Additional analyses of the effect of risk on firm performance 
 
A supplementary analysis examines the effect of risk on bank performance. This effect on 
efficiency and accounting ratios is obtained by estimating the following regression for the full period: 
0 1 1 2 1 3 1Performance NPL CAR Controlsk k k k kt t t t t tα β β β ψ υ− − −= + + + + + , (A1) 
where: 1,...,k K=  and 1,...,t T=  represent the cross-sectional units and the time periods, 
respectively; tψ  is the time-specific effect and ktυ  is the error term. The disturbance takes the form 
[0, ]k kt N υσυ   when the dependent variable is the efficiency score. When ROA and NIM are the 
dependent variables, the error term takes the form k k kt tυ ε η= + , where kε  is the unobserved time-
invariant firm-specific effect that controls for unobservable heterogeneity, and ktη  is a stochastic error 
term that varies cross-time and cross-units. Control variables are bank size, defined as the natural 
logarithm of total assets (lagged) and time dummies. 
Our performance assessments imply using three different dependent variables: efficiency, 
ROA, and NIM. Due to their statistical properties, we use different techniques. When the efficiency 
score is the dependent variable ( [0, )kδ ∈ +∞ ), we use a truncated regression (Greene 2003; Simar and 
Wilson 2011). Thus, the model takes the form 'k k kXδ α β υ≈ + + . Parameter estimates are obtained 
by the maximum likelihood method, and disturbances are constructed through parametric 
bootstrapping (2,000 replications) to derive more accurate error terms. 
Accounting ratios are unbounded by definition, so we can employ econometric tool that 
allows taking into consideration the unobserved and constant heterogeneity among the analysed 
banks. Also, the presence of firm specific unobservable fixed effects that can be correlated with some 
explanatory variables should be accounted for. Consequently, coefficients are estimated using the 
system generalised method of moments (GMM). For robustness, we also estimate fixed effects 
regressions and the results do not change. 
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Table A1. Regression results 
 Truncated GMM 
 Efficiency ROA NIM 
NPL ratio (t-1)   1.6813** (0.6660) 
–0.1268*** 
(0.0392) 
–0.0466** 
(0.0180) 
CAR (t-1) –0.0155 (0.0855) 
  0.0904*** 
(0.0080) 
0.1652*** 
(0.0037) 
Size (ln assets) (t-1)   0.0030 (0.0093) 
  0.0001 
(0.0001) 
–0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept –0.1001 (0.1886) 
  0.0028 
(0.0147) 
  0.0344*** 
(0.0067) 
Pseudo R2 0.0668   
Log likelihood 300.8492   
Wald test (chi2) 56.72*** 204.42*** 433.56*** 
Sargan test  44.83 40.28 
Test for AR1    0.71 –1.99** 
Test for AR2  –0.89 0.94 
Average VIF 1.87 1.87 1.87 
Observations 
648 
(352 
truncated) 
648 648 
For the truncated regression using the efficiency score as dependent variable bootstrapped standard errors (2,000 
iterations) are presented in brackets. For GMM regressions (ROA and NIM) robust standard errors are presented 
in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. Results do not change 
significantly when introducing an interaction term between size and ownership type. 
 
 
